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Domestic Violence, Gun Possession,  
and the Importance of Context 
WESLEY M. OLIVER* 
Context is everything.  
A federal law prohibits those convicted of committing an act of domestic 
violence from possessing weapons.1 This term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
that this statute would apply even to those convicted of crimes that did not 
necessarily involve violent acts.2 This conclusion strains the ordinary meaning of 
language, but is quite consistent with a long tradition in criminal cases that favors a 
pro-government interpretation of a statute when the public welfare is at stake. And 
domestic violence, Justice Sotomayor stressed in her opinion, has reached epidemic 
levels, prompting Congress to get guns out of the hands of abusers.3 
Congress in 1996 expanded existing felon-in-possession laws that forbid the 
possession of a firearm, or any commerce involving a firearm, by any person who 
has committed a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”4 The statute defines 
such a misdemeanor as one involving “the use or attempted use of physical force” 
against a spouse, child, or similarly situated person.5  
The Supreme Court’s opinion this term in United States v. Castleman concluded 
that even a misdemeanor involving only an “offensive touching” was sufficient to 
trigger the prohibition.6 Viewed entirely through the lens of the statute, this result is 
particularly surprising. Just four years ago, the Supreme Court interpreted another 
provision of this same statute and concluded that something more than a mere 
unwanted touching was required to satisfy the requirement of “physical force.”7  
In 2010, the Court in Johnson v. United States interpreted another federal 
provision forbidding firearm possession by those with criminal records.8 Johnson 
considered whether a simple battery conviction was sufficient to enhance a 
defendant’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The 
enhancement applied if a defendant possessed a firearm having previously 
committed three “violent felonies,” which were defined as “any crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another . . . .”9 The ACCA thus included the same “physical force” requirement as 
                                                                                                             
 
* Associate Professor of Law and Criminal Justice Program Director, Duquesne Law 
School. B.A., J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University. 
1 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2014). 
2 United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1413 (2014).  
3 Id. at 1409. 
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); Alison J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection of Domestic 
Violence and Guns: The Public Interest Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 822, 837–38 (2000).  
5 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). 
6 Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1410. 
7 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 142 (2010).  
8 Id. at 137. 
9 Id. at 136 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)). 
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the federal prohibition of gun possession by those convicted of misdemeanor acts 
of domestic violence. 
In Johnson, however, the Court concluded that a charge of simple battery—
which could be no more than an offensive touching—did not necessarily constitute 
“physical force.”10 The defendant in Johnson had three prior state convictions in 
Florida that the government offered as the predicates for the enhancement under the 
ACCA: an aggravated battery, a burglary, and a simple battery (which state law 
defined as a felony because of his prior record).11 The record before the Supreme 
Court did not indicate how the state proved the simple battery. There were two 
ways to demonstrate the defendant’s guilt, either through “[a]ctually and 
intentionally touch[ing] or strik[ing] another person against that person’s will,” or 
“[i]ntentionally caus[ing] bodily harm to another person.”12 Johnson’s battery 
conviction therefore may have required the prosecution to prove nothing more than 
minimal undesired contact. 
At common law, simple battery required “force” as an element, and offensive 
touching was sufficient to satisfy this element. In Johnson, however, the Court 
recognized that the ACCA added something to the common law requirement for 
simple battery, identifying only crimes involving “physical force.”13 Further, the 
Court noted that “physical force” was being used to define the term “violent 
felony,” which “connotes a substantial degree of force.”14 “Physical force,” the 
Court concluded, must be force that is “capable of causing physical pain or injury 
to another person.”15  
In Castleman, by contrast, the Court concluded that a federal law prohibiting the 
possession of firearms by those convicted of misdemeanors involving domestic 
violence (that is, limited by Congressional definition to crimes involving “physical 
force”) could be triggered just by a conviction of unwanted touching of an intimate 
partner.16 The majority concluded that the context of the term “physical force” 
mattered. In Johnson, it was used to define violent felony; in Castleman, it was 
used to define an act of domestic violence.17 While the term violent felony 
“connotes a substantial degree of force,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, “that is not true 
of ‘domestic violence,’ which is a term of art encompassing acts that one might not 
characterize as ‘violent’ in a nondomestic context.”18 
The Castleman ruling resulted in the same phrase having different meanings in 
the same statute—ideally, Justice Scalia pointed out, something courts tend to 
avoid.19 Scalia further observed that nothing about Castleman required the broad 
rule or the conflicting statutory interpretation that the majority created.20 Castleman 
had been convicted under a Tennessee statute forbidding “intentionally or 
                                                                                                             
 
10 Id. at 143. 
11 Id. at 137. 
12 FLA. STAT. § 784.03 (2014). 
13 Id. at 140 (emphasis added). 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411–12 (2014). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1411. 
19 Id. at 1417 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 33–34 (2005)).  
20 Id. at 1422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury” to another.21 The record thus clearly reflected 
not only that he had done something more than an offensive touching, it 
demonstrated that his actions satisfied Johnson’s standard for physical force. Force 
that has caused injury is certainly force capable of causing injury. 
The result in Castleman is explained not just by the phrase “physical force,” but 
by the broader context of the case. While Castleman’s conviction would have been 
affirmed under either Sotomayor’s or Scalia’s interpretation of the statute, there is a 
substantial practical distinction between the approaches of the two justices in this 
opinion. Justice Sotomayor’s interpretation of “physical force” would forbid a 
much larger category of persons from possessing guns than Justice Scalia’s 
interpretation.  
In light of the Johnson case, Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion doubtlessly 
stretches traditional concepts of statutory interpretation and stare decisis, but is 
very consistent with the broad interpretation courts give to criminal laws enacted to 
protect the public from future harm. Much of criminal law is designed to prevent 
harm by deterring dangerous acts.22 Sometimes, however, the criminal law 
punishes relatively minor acts that themselves are not harmful but may ripen into 
something dangerous.23 Drugs mislabeled by a manufacturer pose a danger to all 
the potential purchasers greatly disproportionate to the initial careless act.24 
Individuals who drive while intoxicated pose an extraordinary risk to other 
motorists.25 When courts encounter statutes with public welfare goals, they tend to 
give the legislature’s language as broad a reach as is reasonably possible.26 This 
seems to be an implicit, and close to explicit, reason for the majority’s opinion in 
Castleman. 
The opinion began not with a statement of the narrow issue but rather with a 
discussion of the background of the act in question: “Recognizing that ‘[f]irearms 
and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination,’ Congress forbade the 
possession of firearms by anyone convicted of ‘a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.’”27 The Court then observed that there are a million victims of domestic 
abuse annually, with hundreds of those incidents resulting in death. The Court 
                                                                                                             
 
21 Id. at 1409. 
22 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of 
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 853 (2001) (“All offenses spring from a 
single source, the state’s duty to guard the public welfare against social dangers.”). 
23 See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 419 (1993) (observing that selling impure food or drugs, driving 
faster than the posted limit, selling alcohol to minors, and improperly handling dangerous 
chemicals are all strict liability crimes). 
24 Id. (explaining that strict liability is imposed because “a pharmaceutical manufacturer is in 
a unique position to know and control product quality”). 
25 See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (recognizing 
“the magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and] the States’ interest in eradicating it”). 
26 See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (interpreting hand grenade 
prohibition as strict liability offense in light of public safety interest animating the statute); 
Andrew Oliveria, Christopher Schenck, Christopher D. Cole & Nicole L. Janes, 
Environmental Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 347, 393 (2005) (observing that “[b]ecause the 
statute is directed at ‘public welfare offenses,’ most courts interpret the [Rivers and Harbors 
Act] broadly”). 
27 United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014) (internal citations omitted). 
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noted that “[d]omestic violence often escalates in severity over time, and the 
presence of a firearm increases the likelihood that it will escalate to 
homicide . . . .”28 Finally, the majority observed that one Senator speaking in favor 
of this provision stated that “‘all too often,’ . . . ‘the only difference between a 
battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.’”29 
If the work of the Court in Castleman is judged by its adherence to canons of 
statutory interpretation, the opinion may come up lacking.30 If, however, the Court 
is judged on its interpretation of a public welfare statute—or something akin to a 
public welfare statute—its broad interpretation is quite consistent with a long line 
criminal law cases. Courts often face ambiguous language, or even language 
seeming to strongly limit liability, and conclude that strong public policy, designed 
to protect the welfare of citizens, permits a broad view of a criminal statute, the 
rule of lenity notwithstanding.31 
Often courts will not even acknowledge the tension between the statutory 
language and the strong public policy. For example, a majority of state legislatures 
expressly recognize the legitimacy of faith healing as an accepted method of 
treatment for medical illness.32 When, however, a child’s death results from the 
failure to seek medical treatment, courts have been unreceptive to the logical 
extension of this legislatively mandated religious tolerance. They uniformly reject 
these statutes as a defense to manslaughter based solely on their interpretation of 
the statutory language.33  
A Massachusetts case illustrates the extent to which courts will stretch statutory 
language to preserve a public policy encouraging even the most devout Christian 
Scientist parents to seek medical attention when the lives of their children are in 
danger.34 David and Ginger Twitchell relied entirely on prayer as their two-and-a-
half year old son died from the consequences of peritonitis caused by the 
perforation of his bowel, a condition easily remediable by surgery.35 The 
                                                                                                             
 
28 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
29 Id. at 1409 (quoting 142 Cong. Rec. 22986 (1996) (statement of Sen. Wellstone)). 
30 See Deborah Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in 
Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 871 (2012) (“[F]or statutes that are identified 
as in pari materia (in the same manner), courts will apply prior judicial interpretations not 
just to subsequent cases that arise under the statute actually interpreted but also to identical 
or similar language in other statutes addressing similar issues.”) (italics in original). See also 
CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 486–89 (2011) (discussing the “in pari 
materia” canon of statutory interpretation). 
31 There is a fairly lively debate as to whether the rule of lenity continues to exist. See Note, 
The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006) (discussing academic 
perspectives on the rule). 
32 See Allison Ciullo, Note, Prosecution Without Persecution: The Inability of Courts to 
Recognize Christian Science Spiritual Healing and a Shift Toward Legislative Action, 42 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 157 (2007). 
33 See, e.g., State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1991); Walker v. Superior Court, 
763 P.2d 852, 866 (Cal. 1988) (“[P]rayer treatment will be accommodated as an acceptable 
means of attending to the needs of a child only insofar as serious physical harm or illness is 
not at risk.”); Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 1986) (“Prayer is not permitted as a 
defense when a caretaker engages in omissive conduct which results in the child’s death.”). 
34 Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993).  
35 Id. at 612. 
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Twitchells relied on a Massachusetts statute, quoted in their church’s literature, that 
said: “A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or lack proper physical care for 
the sole reason that he is being provided remedial treatment by spiritual means 
alone in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious 
denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof.”36 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed that this language was 
adopted by the legislature in a statute titled “An Act defining the term ‘proper 
physical care’ under the law relative to care of children by a parent.”37 The court 
concluded that this provision “refer[red] to neglect and lack of proper physical 
care,” which could be demonstrated by either “(1) neglect to provide support [or] 
(2) willful failure to provide necessary and proper care.”38 These concepts, the 
court concluded, were not relevant to a homicide prosecution. By the reasoning of 
the court, “wanton and reckless conduct,” which was required to demonstrate 
homicide, “is not a form of negligence” nor does it “involve a wilful intention to 
cause the resulting harm.”39 To describe the court’s reasoning as tortured would be 
generous, but the public policy supported by the decision was obviously 
compelling. Even in a country that respects religious diversity, society has an 
extraordinary interest in ensuring that toddlers not die because of their parents’ 
faith. 
In the context of strict liability crimes, courts have been more explicit about 
recognizing that they were construing ambiguous statutes in favor of the state 
because a public welfare interest animated the legislature to act. Legislatures are 
rarely clear about their desire to eliminate a mens rea requirement for a crime.40 In 
virtually every instance in which a court has concluded that a crime does not 
require culpability, legislatures have simply been silent on what mental state is 
required—and, often, these legislatures have instructed courts to find that a mens 
rea term is implicitly required unless the legislative intent to exclude one is clear.41 
Courts are thus typically facing ambiguity, with a presumption against strict 
liability, whenever they conclude that no mens rea is required for a crime. Yet 
courts frequently find, with no statutory language or legislative history, that the 
legislature intended to fashion a strict liability crime. Most often, a court’s 
conclusion that the legislature intended to deter a relatively minor crime to prevent 
some serious social harm is sufficient for it to find that the crime is one of strict 
liability.42  
                                                                                                             
 
36 Id. at 612 n.4. (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 273, § 1 (1992)). This provision of the law 
was repealed as a result of this case. Ciullo, supra note 32, at 182–83. 
37 Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 615. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 615–616. 
40 See Daryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 
DUKE L.J. 285, 322–23 (2012) (noting rare instances of legislatures expressly eliminating 
mens rea terms).  
41 Id. at 313–16 (recognizing that legislative presumptions against strict liability exist but are 
frequently not followed).  
42 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5(a) 291 (5th ed. 2010) (recognizing a variety 
of factors courts use to determine whether a statute contains a strict liability offense, but 
noting “the more serious the consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature 
meant to impose liability without regard to fault and vice versa”). 
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Strict liability crimes are largely a creation of the modern regulatory state. The 
justification for such crimes has evolved and become more sophisticated over the 
course of the twentieth century.43 United States v. Balint is typically taught as the 
paradigmatic case in which the Supreme Court permitted a conviction without 
requiring the prosecution to demonstrate criminal culpability. This was certainly 
one of the earlier examples of judicially recognized strict liability, though (as 
Balint itself recognizes) other decisions approving of strict liability crimes predated 
it.44 Balint concluded that statutes can be reasonably interpreted to have omitted a 
mens rea requirement when the statute in question seeks to achieve “some social 
betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se.”45 
Subsequent cases have offered a variety of factors for courts to consider in 
evaluating whether, in the absence of a stated mens rea requirement, a court should 
conclude that the legislature intended a strict liability offense—but a public welfare 
exception has remained as the most frequently cited factor.46  
Almost exactly forty years ago, Judge Breitel on the New York Court of 
Appeals concluded, much like Justice Sotomayor, that statutes should be 
interpreted differently when the primary aim of the statute is to prevent future harm 
rather than punish past criminal acts. In People v. Alamo, the New York court 
considered whether breaking into a car and sitting behind the wheel constituted a 
completed act of larceny or merely an attempt when the police intercepted the 
would-be car thief.47 The majority concluded that achieving dominion and control 
over a vehicle is sufficient for a conviction for driving while intoxicated if the 
would-be driver is drunk, and therefore should also be sufficient for a larceny 
conviction.48 The majority observed that “consistency is always desirable in the 
application of various laws.”49 In dissent, Judge Breitel presented a persuasive 
argument for the contrary result. He observed that “[t]he statutory proscription 
against persons operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is directed at a different 
evil involving a lesser degree of turpitude and a special problem of proof hardly 
applicable to larceny.”50 That “different evil” was, of course, the risk that drunken 
driving would lead to fatalities, while larceny certainly does not naturally ripen into 
a risk to human life. 
Justice Scalia’s criticisms of the majority opinion in Castleman are well founded 
if courts are expected to look only to the legislative text and not to the goals of 
Congress. An appreciation of the broader context of criminal statutes has, however, 
long animated judges. There is as at least as much of a tradition of broadly 
                                                                                                             
 
43 See Levenson, supra note 23, at 419 (noting that strict liability offenses were 
“promulgated to address the dangers brought about by the advent of the industrial 
revolution”). See also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922) (“[T]he general rule 
at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of 
every crime.”). 
44 Balint, 258 U.S. at 252. 
45 Id. 
46 See Dannye Holley, Culpability Evaluations in the State Supreme Courts from 1977 to 
1999: A “Model” Assessment, 34 AKRON L. REV. 401, 405–07 (2001). 
47 315 N.E.2d 446 (N.Y. 1974).  
48 Id. at 449–50. 
49 Id. at 449. 
50 Id. at 451 (Breitel, J., dissenting).  
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construing public welfare statutes as there is of ensuring that legislative terms are 
consistently construed. Perhaps not accidentally, the Court agreed to hear this case 
within months of the twentieth anniversary of the passage of the Violence Against 
Women Act.51 The fear of battery ripening into homicide ultimately presented, for 
the Court, a public safety concern analogous to those used by many other courts to 
justify a broader interpretation of statutes than their texts would seem to permit.  
 
                                                                                                             
 
51 The Act was made law on September 13, 1994. See Violence Against Women Act of 
1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
